Introduction
The classic results of Gibbard [6] and Satterthwaite [13] have shown that unless preferences are restricted, the only decentralized mechanism which induces truth-telling behaviour by individual agents is the dictatorial one. This impossibility result has induced a huge literature which analyzes the possibility of constructing strategy-proof mechanisms under various alternative frameworks. One variant, due to Gibbard [7, 8] , which is the main focus of this paper is the extension of the original impossibility result to mechanisms which assign a probability distribution over the set of feasible outcomes for each profile of preferences. Gibbard [7] characterized the class of such strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms or decision schemes.
He showed that a strategy-proof decision scheme must be a convex combination of duples and unilaterals. A duple is a mechanism which assigns positive probability to at most two alternatives, the pair of alternatives being independent of the profile of preferences, while a unilateral is one where the preference ordering of a single individual dictates the social lottery over feasible alternatives.
1
Such mechanisms need not satisfy even a weak form of efficiency. That is, even if all individuals unanimously prefer an alternative a to all other alternatives, the mechanism need not assign a probability of one to a. The only strategy-proof mechanisms satisfying even this weak form of efficiency are random dictatorships, in which each individual is assigned a fixed probability of being a dictator -fixed in the sense that these probabilities are independent of the preference profile. Duggan [3] and Nandeibam [10] provide alternative proofs of the random dictatorship result, while Dutta et al. [4] show that the random dictatorship result holds even if the feasible set of alternatives is some convex set in k (with k > 1), and preferences are strictly convex and continuous with a unique peak.
2
In the original Gibbard [7, 8] framework, the decision scheme used only ordinal information about individual preferences. However, Gibbard assumed that individual preferences were represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions since these functions were used to rank alternative probability distributions. Thus, the assumption that the decision scheme can use only ordinal information about preferences imposed a strong invariance requirement on the aggregation rule. In order to appreciate the strength of the invariance requirement, we point out that strategy-proof ordinal decision schemes must satisfy a "local" property. That is, suppose that a voter changes her preference by "switching" two contiguous alternatives. In 1 See Barbera [1, 2] for related characterizations of strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms. 2 See also Ehlers et al. [5] .
the ordinal context, strategy-proofness will immediately imply that only the probabilities of the two alternatives being switched are affected. This is a property with strong implications and considerably simplifies the task of characterizing strategy-proof ordinal decision schemes.
In contrast, if a strategy-proof decision scheme utilizes cardinal information, then a change in the utility of a single alternative for a voter could in principle, have a "global" impact, that is, the probability of all alternatives could be affected. This makes the analysis in the cardinal model far more difficult.
Despite this difficulty, Hylland [9] , in an important and regrettably unpublished paper,
showed that the random dictatorship result holds even if the decision scheme is allowed to use cardinal information. In this paper, we have two main objectives. First, we provide an alternative and considerably simpler proof of Hylland's theorem. 3 Second, we consider a framework where essentially individuals cannot discern infinitesimally small differences in utility. In particular, we assume that if an alternative a is strictly preferred to another alternative b, then the utility difference between a and b is at least some fixed number which we refer to as the grid size. We construct an example to show that the random dictatorship result no longer holds when individual utility functions satisfy this additional restriction. We then analyze the consequences of gradually reducing the grid size. That is, we consider an arbitrary sequence of strategy-proof and unanimous decision schemes defined on a sequence of decreasing grid sizes approaching zero. We obtain a 'limit' random dictatorship result in the sense that the sequence of such decision schemes must converge to a random dictatorship for all profiles for which the limit exists.
The Model
Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a M } be a finite set of alternatives, with M ≥ 3. A lottery λ is a probability distribution over the set A, and can be identified with an M -vector whose j th component λ j denotes the probability that λ assigns to a j ∈ A. Clearly every component of λ is non-negative and the sum of the components is 1. The set of lotteries is denoted by L.
The set of voters will be denoted by I = {1, 2, . . . , N }. Each voter i has a preference ordering R i over the elements of the set A. The ordering R i is represented by an admissible utility function u i , which is unique up to affine transformations. We normalize utility functions by assuming that the utility of the maximal element, which is assumed to be unique, is one, while the utility of the worst element is zero. We do not require distinct alternatives to have distinct utility levels (i.e. it is not required that R i is a strict ordering).
Let U denote the set of admissible utility functions. We will use τ (u i ) to refer to the maximal element of utility function u i .
In section 4, we will impose an additional restriction on admissible utility functions -we will assume that the minimal difference in utility levels of alternatives which have different utilities is at least some η > 0. We refer to η as the grid size.
A utility profile is an N -tuple (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N ) ∈ U N . Let u denote the utility profile (u 1 , . . . , u N ), and (u i , u −i ) denote the profile (u 1 , . . . , u i−1 , u i , u i+1 , . . . , u N ).
A CDS utilizes cardinal information in individuals' utility functions and specifies a probability distribution over the set of alternatives for each profile of utility functions. We let φ j (u), j = 1, 2, . . . , M denote the probability on alternative a j in the lottery φ(u).
A CDS which only utilizes ordinal information about individual utility functions will be called an Ordinal Decision Scheme.
Two admissible utility functions u i , u i are ordinally equivalent if for all a k , a j ∈ A,
Similarly, two utility profiles u and u are ordinally equivalent if each pair u i , u i is ordinally equivalent.
Definition 2 An Ordinal Decision Scheme (ODS) is a CDS φ with the property that φ(u) = φ(u ) whenever u and u are ordinally equivalent.
Different concepts of efficiency can be associated with decision schemes. One concept which has been used is that of ex post efficiency.
4
Definition 3 A CDS φ is ex post efficient if for all a j , a k ∈ A and for all admissible utility
An ex post efficient CDS ensures that a Pareto non-optimal alternative is never assigned positive probability. A considerably weaker condition is that of Unanimity.
Definition 4 A CDS φ satisfies Unanimity if for all a j ∈ A and for all admissible utility profiles u, φ j (u) = 1 if τ (u i ) = a j for all i ∈ I.
4 See for instance Gibbard [7] ), Duggan [3] , Nandeibam [10] .
Unanimity simply requires that if an alternative is best for all individuals, then it should be assigned probability one.
Random dictatorships are an important class of ordinal decision schemes. These are rules in which each individual has a fixed probability (that is, independent of the utility profile)
of being a dictator. More formally,
Definition 5
The CDS is a random dictatorship if there exist non-negative real numbers
We assume that individuals rank alternative lotteries in terms of expected utility.
Definition 7 A CDS is strategy-proof (SP) if it is not manipulable by any voter at any profile.
Thus, a CDS is strategy-proof if no voter can strictly gain in terms of expected utility by misrepresenting her true preferences.
The Hylland Theorem
An example of a strategy-proof decision scheme is the random dictatorship. If i is the dictator, then the alternative which is first in i's preference ordering is chosen with probability one. Since the probability of any voter i being a dictator is independent of the profile of preferences, it is easy to see that no individual has an incentive to misreveal preferences.
The random dictatorship in which each individual has an equal chance of being the dictator is obviously anonymous and efficient -the voting scheme only puts positive weight on alternatives which are Pareto optimal. This might seem to suggest that this random dictatorship provides a positive resolution of the dilemma posed by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result-an equal distribution of power is consistent with efficiency and truthful revelation of preferences. Unfortunately, random dictatorships possess an undesirable property, as shown in the following example.
Example 1 Let |I| = 1000, and A = {a 1 , . . . , a 1001 }. Consider a profile P such that for each individual i, a i P i a 1001 P i a for all a ∈ A\{a i , a 1001 }. Although every individual considers a 1001 as the second most preferred alternative, and no two individuals agree on what is the best alternative in A, a random dictatorship must assign zero probability to a 1001 .
This example provides a motivation to search for other strategy-proof decision schemes.
Unfortunately, Hylland [9] proved that random dictatorships constitute the only class of unanimous and strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. In this section, we provide a relatively simple proof of Hylland's theorem, which is stated below.
Theorem 1 A CDS satisfies strategy-proofness and unanimity if and only if it is a random dictatorship.
Proof: It is clear that a random dictatorship satisfies unanimity and is also strategy-proof.
We prove the converse.
Step 1: We first show that for |N | = 2, a unanimous and strategy-proof CDS φ is a random dictatorship.
In the proof of this step, for k, j ∈ {1, . . . , M } with k = j and a positive number η, we frequently use the notation u η jk for an admissible utility function that assigns 1 to a j , 1 − η to a k , and strictly lower utilities to all other alternatives.
Pick a j ∈ A, and let u 1 be an admissible utility function such that τ (u 1 ) = a j . Also pick a k ∈ A and η > 0, and consider u η kj ∈ U. We now consider the consequences of letting η → 0.
So, in order to prevent voter 2 from manipulating at (u 1 , u η kj ) by announcing u 2 , we must have
The reverse inequality is obviously true.
Proof: Suppose that the claim is false. Assume w.l.o.g. that lim
But the RHS of this expression is strictly positive by assumption. Therefore there exists η small
. This implies that voter 1 can manipulate φ at (u 1 , u η kj ) via v 1 which contradicts strategy-proofness of φ. Let u η jk ∈ U and let u 2 ∈ U with τ (u 2 ) = a k .
which is what we have to prove.
Let a j , a k , a s , a t ∈ A with a j = a k and a s = a t . Let u 1 and v 1 be admissible utility functions such that τ (u 1 ) = a j and τ (v 1 ) = a s .
Proof: We know from Claim 2 that lim η→0 φ(u 1 , u η kj ) does not depend on u 1 as long as the first-ranked alternative in u 1 is a j . We can therefore denote this limit w.l.o.g. as λ j (j, k). So we have to prove that λ j (j, k) = λ s (s, t). We will first prove that λ j (j, k) = λ s (s, k). Let δ, and γ be positive numbers and let v 1 be an admissible utility function with
Now consider voter 1 in the profile (v 1 , u γ ks ). Her maximal expected utility from truthtelling is φ s (v 1 , u
Since φ is strategy-proof, we have
Since the inequality above is true for all δ, and γ, we can take limits to obtain lim ,γ,δ→0
Observe that Claims 2 and 3 imply that lim 
By reversing the roles of a s and a j we also have the reverse inequality, and thus λ s (s, k) = λ j (j, k).
By an argument symmetric to the one in the first part of the proof Claim 4, we obtain λ k (s, k) = λ t (s, t). So altogether we have
where the second and last equalities follow from Claim 1.
We now summarize the implication of Claims 1 through 4. There exists a real number λ lying between 0 and 1 with the following properties. Let a j and a k be two arbitrary but distinct alternatives. Consider a utility profile where a j and a k are first-ranked for voters 1 and 2 respectively. Now consider a sequence of utility profiles where the utility function of voter 1 is fixed but the utility function of voter 2 is changed in a way such that a k remains first-ranked and the utility of a j is increased to 1. Then the sequence of probabilities associated with alternative a j converges to λ while that of a k converges to 1−λ.
Similarly, if we fix voter 2's utility function and consider a sequence of utility functions for voter 1 where a k increases to 1, then the sequence of probabilities associated with a j and a k converges once again to λ and 1 − λ respectively. 
We now complete the proof of Claim 5.
For > 0 define admissible utility functionsū 1 andū 2 such that
Then, by the summary of Claims 1-4 above,
Then, for small enough, 1 can manipulate φ at (ū 1 , u δ ks ) via u η js as δ → 0. Hence,
We similarly have
In order to prevent 2 from manipulating φ at (u η js ,ū 2 ) for small values of as η → 0, we need
Combining inequalities (1) and (2) we obtain
This implies that λ l = 0 for each l = j, k. This contradicts λ s > 0, and hence completes the proof of Claim 5.
Combining Claims 1-5, we see that for any profile with unequal top alternatives all probability is assigned to the top alternatives (Claim 5), and that agents 1 and 2 can guarantee probabilities as close to λ and 1 − λ as desired on their respective top alternatives (Claims 1-4). Hence, φ is a random dictatorship with weights λ and 1 − λ. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: We now show that a unanimous and strategy-proof CDS is a random dictatorship for arbitrary N . We assume that the statement is true for all I with N − 1 or fewer agents, and we now establish it for N . So let φ be an N -agent CDS satisfying unanimity and strategy-proofness.
Define a CDS g : U N −1 → L for an N − 1 agent society, as follows:
Then g inherits unanimity from φ. We first show that g is strategy-proof. Clearly, if i ∈ {3, . . . , N } manipulates g at (u 1 , u 3 , . . . , u N ), then i manipulates φ at (u 1 , u 1 , u 3 , . . . , u N ).
This contradicts the assumption that φ is strategy-proof.
Similarly, since 2 cannot manipulate (u 2 , u 1 , . . . , u N ) via u 2 , we have
Putting these inequalities together,
Hence, 1 cannot manipulate g at u via u 2 . This shows that g is strategy-proof.
The induction hypothesis establishes that g must be a random dictatorship. Let β be the weight of the "coalesced" individual 1 in the random dictatorship g, while β i is the weight for i = 3, . . . , N .
Fix an arbitrary (N − 2)-tuple of utilities (u 3 , . . . , u N ), and with some abuse of notation, write φ(u 1 , u 2 ) ≡ φ(u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , . . . , u N ) for any pair u 1 , u 2 .
Step 2.1: Suppose β = 0.
We want to show that for all (u 1 , u 2 ), φ(u 1 , u 2 ) = φ(u 1 , u 1 ).
Suppose not. Then, there are u 1 , u 2 and a k such that
Now, for > 0, choose u such that
Note that
since the coalesced individual has zero weight in the random dictatorship g. From equations (3) and (4) and the specification of u , it follows that
In order to prevent individual 1 from manipulating φ at (u , u , u 3 , . . . , u N ), we need
In order to prevent individual 2 from manipulating φ at (u 1 , u , u 3 , . . . , u N ), we need
Putting these inequalities together, we need
But, equation (5) shows that this cannot be satisfied for all values of , a contradiction.
Hence, in this case, φ is a random dictatorship with weights (0, 0, β 3 , . . . , β N ).
Step 2.2: Suppose β > 0.
Let I = {3, . . . , N }. Define a function h : U {1,2} → L as follows:
We want to show that h is a 2-person CDS satisfying strategy-proofness and unanimity.
First, we show that h is a CDS. That is, h j (u 1 , u 2 ) ≥ 0 for all a j ∈ A, and j h j (u 1 , u 2 ) = 1.
Note that j h j (u 1 , u 2 ) = 1 follows from the definition of h itself. So, we only need to
show that each h j (u 1 , u 2 ) is non-negative.
But, this shows that equation (6) is not satisfied for some value of , and hence contradicts the assumption that φ is strategy-proof.
Claim 1 establishes that for all l = j, h l (u 1 , u 2 ) ≥ 0. We still need to show that
But, notice that we could have "started" from u 2 , and proved that
We now want to show that h satisfies unanimity. Choose any u 1 , u 2 such that τ (u 1 ) = τ (u 2 ) = a j for some a j ∈ A. Take any a k ∈ A, and let the upper contour set of u 1 for a k be
Proof: Suppose there is some a k such that
For small > 0 choose u such that (i) u 1 and u are ordinally equivalent.
Now, strategy-proofness of φ implies that equation (6) also holds for the new specification of u .
Noting that φ(u , u ) = φ(u 1 , u 1 ), equations (8) and (6) cannot hold simultaneously as → 0.
Hence, either the claim is true or φ(u 1 , u 1 ) stochastically dominates φ(u 1 , u 2 ), i.e., all sums in the LHS of (8) are non-negative and at least one sum is positive. But, note that if φ(u 1 , u 1 ) stochastically dominates φ(u 1 , u 2 ), then it is well known 6 that
Noting that φ(u 1 , u 1 ) = φ(u 2 , u 2 ), equation (9) shows that 1 manipulates φ at (u 1 , u 2 ) via u 2 . Hence, Claim 2 is true.
Claim 2 immediately establishes that h satisfies unanimity.
We now show that h is strategy-proof. Pick any utility functions u 1 , u 2 , u 1 . Then
Therefore voter 1 cannot manipulate in h. An identical argument establishes that 2 cannot manipulate h either.
Hence, h must be a random dictatorship with weights α 1 and α 2 .
Let β 1 = α 1 β and β 2 = α 2 β. We want to show that φ is a random dictatorship with weights β 1 , . . . , β N . Notice that we would have proved this if we can show that the weights of the 2-agent h constructed earlier do not depend on the choice of (u 3 , . . . , u N ) used in the construction of h. In fact, it is sufficient to show that the weights do not change when (say) u 3 changes to u 3 , because we can change the profile from (u 3 , . . . , u N ) to (u 3 , . . . , u N ) by changing utility functions one at a time.
Suppose that the weights change to α 1 and α 2 with α 1 > α 1 when u 3 changes to u 3 . We show that this violates strategy-proofness of φ.
where u 3 (a l ) = 0, that is, a l is the worst element in terms of u 3 . Then, it is easy to check that 1 manipulates φ at (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , . . . , u N ) since there is a probability transfer of (βα 1 − βα 1 ) from a l to a j (with probabilities on all other elements remaining the same) when 3 states u 3 rather than u 3 . Hence, the weights cannot change if the top elements of u 3 and u 3 are the same.
6 See, for instance Quirk and Saposnik [12] . Now, suppose τ (u 3 ) = a j and τ (u 3 ) = a k = a j . Using arguments of the previous paragraph, we can assume that u 3 (a k ) = 1− and u 3 (a l ) = 0. Again, assume that τ (u 1 ) = a j and τ (u 2 ) = a l . Then,
This difference can be made positive by choosing small enough. So, φ violates SP.
This concludes the proof of the induction step, and thus of Theorem 1.
Strategy-proofness with utility grids
Our proof technique suggests an interesting extension of the basic framework. In particular, our proof relies heavily on the fact that we can specify utility profiles where the utility of some alternative is arbitrarily close to 1 although it is not maximal. How essential is this in generating the random dictatorship result? In order to answer this question, we now assume that an admissible utility function has the property that the minimal difference in utility levels of alternatives which have different utilities is at least some η > 0.
More formally, let η = η k = (M − 1) −k where k is a positive integer. For every such η, an admissible utility function is a mapping u i : A → {0, η, 2η, . . . , 1 − η, 1}, satisfying the restrictions that there exists a unique element a j ∈ A such that u i (a j ) = 1 and that there exists some a k ∈ A such that u i (a k ) = 0.
For every grid size η, we shall let U η denote the set of admissible utility functions. A utility
N denote the utility profiles (u 1 , . . . , u N ), and (u 1 , . . . , u i−1 , u i , u i+1 , . . . , u N ) respectively.
An Example
The random dictatorship result no longer holds in this framework. The following counterexample demonstrates that non-maximal elements can get positive probability for some utility profiles.
Example 2 Let I = {1, 2}, |A| = 3. As before, the best alternative has utility 1, the worst has utility 0, while the maximum utility that the middle alternative can get is 1 − η.
Consider the following rule φ * .
(i) If τ (u 1 ) = τ (u 2 ), then φ * assigns probability 1 to the unanimous top alternative.
(ii) If there are only two Pareto optimal alternatives at a profile, then φ * assigns 0.5 to each of these.
(iii) If there are three Pareto optimal alternatives at the profile u, but u i (a k ) < 0.5 for some i where a k is the middle alternative, then φ * assigns probability 0.5 to each top alternative. Clearly, φ * is unanimous. To see that φ * is strategy-proof, suppose the true profile u is such that either cases (ii) or (iii) apply. Without loss of generality, let
. Clearly, 1 cannot increase the probability weight on a 1 . If u 1 (a 2 ) < 0.5, then 1 does not gain by increasing the probability weight on a 2 since at least half of any such increase comes from a reduction in the probability weight on a 1 , 1's most-preferred alternative. If u 1 (a 2 ) ≥ 0.5, then either u 2 (a 2 ) < 0.5 in which case 1 cannot increase the probability weight on a 2 , or u 2 (a 2 ) = 1 in which case 1 can only increase the weight on a 2 to 1.
In case (iv), both individuals have (say) u i (a 2 ) ≥ 0.5. Neither wants to decrease the weight on a 2 to 0 since this will mean an increase of 1 2 d in the probability weight on the worst alternative. Neither individual gains by declaring a 2 to be the most-preferred alternative.
Finally, note that the weight on the middle alternative cannot be greater than η 2(1+η) . For suppose, u 2 (a 2 ) > u 2 (a 3 ) ≥ 0.5 > a 1 , and u 1 (a 3 ) > u 1 (a 1 ) = 1 − η > u 1 (a 2 ). If 1 declares his true utility function, then his expected utility (when 2 also declares his true utility function) is 0.5. If instead 1 declares u 1 (a 1 ) > u 1 (a 3 ) > 0.5 > u 1 (a 2 ), then the probability weights will be
In order to prevent this lottery from giving 1 an expected utility greater than 0.5, we need the upper bound on d.
The example suggests the following related lines of inquiry. First, notice that there is an upper bound on the probability on the middle alternative. Moreover, this upper bound is an increasing function of the grid size. So, is it generally true that if a CDS is strategy-proof and unanimous, then the maximum probability on non-maximal elements is an increasing function of grid size? The question is interesting because the maximum possible probability on non-maximal alternatives is a "crude" measure of the distance from some random dictatorship since the latter assigns zero probability to such alternatives.
Second, the CDS constructed in the example approaches a random dictatorship in the limit as the grid size approaches zero. Again, it is of considerable interest to see whether such a 'limit' random dictatorship result is true. We turn to these questions in the subsequent sections.
A Limit Result
In this section, we first prove a 'limit' random dictatorship result, thus answering the second question at the end of the preceding subsection. We then turn briefly to the first question concerning the maximal probability on non-maximal elements.
Consider the following situation. For k = 1, 2, . . . let {φ η k } be a sequence of strategyproof and unanimous CDS's, each one defined on
there is a minimal number k u such that u ∈ U k for all k ≥ k u . With some abuse of notation we can therefore define
Obviously, this limit does not have to exist for every u. For instance, take different recurring random dictatorships in the sequence of CDS's. We will show, however, that there exists a random dictatorshipφ such thatφ
for all u ∈ U N for which the limit exists.
We first establish a 'local' version of this result in the following theorem. We use the same notation as in the preceding paragraph.
Proof: Throughout the proof, we will use the fact that
Since all subsequences of {φ η k } converge onû and U 1 is finite, we can construct a subsequence of the given sequence of CDSs which converges on every u ∈ U 1 . So we have a
We want to show that φ 1 is a strategy-proof and unanimous CDS on U 1 . To check unanimity, pick any u ∈ U 1 such that for some a j ∈ A, τ (u i ) = a j for all i ∈ I. Then, for
j (u) = 1. We now check that φ 1 is strategy-proof. Suppose to the contrary that φ 1 is not strategyproof. Then, there are u ∈ U 1 , i ∈ I and u i ∈ U η1 such that
But, this contradicts the fact that for each k,
Next, since U 2 is finite, we may construct a subsequence of the sequence φ 1,k which converges on every u ∈ U 2 . So we have a subsequence φ 2,k such that φ 2 (u) ≡ lim k φ 2,k (u)
exists for every u ∈ U 2 . Then, it follows from previous arguments that φ 2 is a strategy-proof and unanimous CDS on U 2 . Also, by construction, φ 1 and φ 2 coincide on U 1 .
Continuing in this way, we construct an infinite sequence φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . of CDS's such that each φ k is a strategy-proof and unanimous CDS on U k , and coincides with φ on U for each < k .
Let u ∈ k U k . Then u ∈ k≥ku U k , and therefore lim k≥ku φ k (u) exists, and is in fact equal to φ ku (u). Denote this limit byφ(u). Then it follows thatφ is a strategy-proof and unanimous CDS on k U k , and therefore from Theorem 1 is a random dictatorship. It follows in particular that lim k→∞ φ η k (û) = φ 1 (û) =φ(û) has zero probability on the non-maximal elements.
Now let u ∈ U N be an arbitrary profile such that lim k→∞ φ η k (u) exists. Since u ∈ k≥ku U k , it follows from the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 2 that this limit is equal toφ(u) whereφ is the random dictatorship constructed there. Hence, we have the following consequence of (the proof of) Theorem 2. for all u ∈ U N for which this limit exists.
Finally, the corollary implies that, when applied to a fixed utility profile, the probabilities put on non-maximal elements by a converging sequence of unanimous and strategy-proof CDS's must converge to zero as the grid size converges to zero. So this provides a partial answer to the first question raised at the end of the preceding subsection.
Conclusion
We have investigated the structure of strategy-proof, cardinal-valued decision schemes satisfying unanimity. One of our contributions is to provide a new and independent proof of Hylland's Random Dictatorship Theorem. The other is to establish a limit random dictatorship result as the size of the utility grid tends to zero. We believe that it is important to analyze strategy-proof cardinal schemes in the finite utility grid model because it sheds light on the role of cardinalization in generating various possibility results. For instance, we would like to be able to determine the maximum probability that can be placed (by a strategy-proof cardinal decision scheme) on non-maximal alternatives for any profile, as a function of the size of the utility grid. It is easy to obtain upper bounds for these probabilities (which vanish in the limit) by extending the arguments that we have used in the proof of Theorem 1 if we make the additional assumption that the decison schemes satisfy ex-post efficiency; however we are unable to show that these bounds are attained. In fact, the class of such cardinal decision schemes appears to fairly "thin" if there are at least four alternatives. We hope to able to address these issues in future research.
